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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 - 2 - 2 (3) (j)
(2002). This Court granted certiorari on November 29,2005.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. ("PMRI") has the authority as a
beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions?
Standard of Review: This is an appeal of a summary judgment. The
standard of review is to review the issues of law for correctness with no deference to
the trial court, Grynberg v. Questar Pipleline Co., 2002 UT 8, para. 20,70 P.3d 1,6;

CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING ISSUES WERE PRESERVED
Power of a Trust Beneficiary to Deal with Trust Assets. In the record of
Forest Meadows, R-0378.

5

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 ("Utah Statute of Frauds.") (1998):
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing."
Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 - 1 (6) (Wrongful Lien, "Definitions") (2005):
""Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it
is recorded or filed is not: .
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner
of the real property."
Utah Code Ann. sec. 57- 1 - 12 ("Form of warranty deed - Effect.") (2000).
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of
the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances,rights,and
privileges thereunto belonging, . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 3 - 1 0 3 ("Effect of failure to record.") (2000).
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded."
6

Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004).
"The common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to, or in conflict
with, the constitution of laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural
and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof,
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1965, F.E. Bates and his wife Mae P. Bates deeded a large tract of land in
Summit County (4,264.68 acres, more or less) by warranty deed to "Security Title
Company, Trustee, a corporation of Utah." There is no contemporaneous evidence
that a trust actually existed or, if a trust did exist, who were it beneficiaries what
were its terms. A copy of the 1965 Bates deed is Addendum document "1". [R0202].
Eight years later, on August 15,1973, W. Brent Jensen, purporting to act as
the president of "Pine Meadow Ranch" ['PMRI'] " executed and acknowledged in
corporate form a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions"
("CC&R's) for part of the area covered by the 1965 Bates Deed (approximately
1,200 acres out of the 4,264.68.) These 1973 CC&R's were recorded on September
28,1973. A copy of the 1973 CC&R's is Document "2" in the Addendum. R-0221230.
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At the time W. Brent Jensen executed the 1973 CC&R's (August 15,1973),
Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., ("PMRI") did not yet exist. It was incorporated on
August 22,1973. R-0358 (certificate of incorporation).
In the 1973 CC&R's, PMRI declares:
"WHEREAS declarant is the owner of or intends to acquire certain property
in Summit County, State of Utah, which is more particularly described as:
The South one-half of section 16; the East half of the Southeast quarter
of Section 17; the East half of the East half of Section 20; All of
Section 21; all in Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian (containing approximately 1,200 acres)." R-0221.
There is no mention of a trust in the declaration. PMRI does not describe itself as
the beneficiary of a trust. PMRI declares it "is the owner of or intends to acquire"
the property. Nothing in the real estate records shows that it then owned or later
acquired the 1,200 acres.
The declaration includes "all of Section 21." By so doing, the declaration
purports to impose the 1973 CC&R's on the western portion of Forest Meadow
Ranch Plat D (the subdivision involved in the companion case). But, in the
companion case, Forest Meadows Property Owners Ass 'n, etc., the trial court ruled
that this property was owned by Security Title Company as trustee for the benefit of
Deseret Diversified Development as beneficiary.
Three years later, on May 6,1976, "Pine Meadow Ranch Plat 'D'" was
8

recorded at the Summit County Recorder's office. R0204-205. The "Owner's
Dedication" on the plat reads as follows.
"OWNER'S DEDICATION
"Know all men by these presents that
, the
undersigned owner
( ) of the above described tract of land, having caused the same to be subdivided
into lots and streets to be hereafter known as the
PINE MEADOW RANCH. PLAT "D"
do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown on this
plat as intended for public use.
"In witness whereof
have hereunto set
this
day of
, A.D. 19
PINE MEADOW RANCH
/s/ W. Brent Jensen
/s/ Zella J. Jensen
Wesley Brent Jensen
Zella J. Jensen
President
Secretary
SECURITY TITLE CO., TRUSTEE
/s/ Gordon H. Dick
/s/ Nancy H. Bartlette
Exec Vice President
Asst, Secretary"
The following "Subdividers Note" appears on the plat:
"SUBDIVIDERS NOTE
"The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and
streets or rights of way to public. It is intended that all streets shown hereon shall
remain the property of the subdivider, Pine Meadow Ranch, and shall be completely
maintained by said owner.
/s/ Pine Meadows Ranch
W. Brent Jensen"
Nothing on the plat makes reference to a trust and PMRI does not describe itself as
9

the beneficiary of a trust. W. Brent Jensen did not sign Plat D for Security Title.
Gordon H. Dick signed for Security Title as its executive vice president.
On July 7,1977, Security Title Company, Trustee, conveyed Lot 6, Pine
Meadow Ranch Plat "D," to Mountainland Properties, Inc.. This lot was eventually
acquired by Petitioner.
On December 31,1979, PMRI was dissolved for failing to file its annual
report. R-0381-383 (certificate of dissolution).
On July 25,1980, Defendant recorded a "Notice of Lien" against Lot 6 by
which it gave notice that it claimed liens against Lot 6 under the 1973 CC&R's "for
the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share fees, special
maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any or all of said items" ("1980
Notice of Lien."). R-0232.
On November 4,1987, Pine Meadow Ranch Plats E, F, G and I were
recorded, these cover different areas within the 1,200 acres, but not all the 1,200
acres. The following persons signed the "Owner's Dedications" on those plats.
Plat

Persons Signing the "Owners' Dedication

Plat E (R-0445)

Security Title Company Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
Pres. and Charles G. Miller, Sec.
C. Mike Nielson
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Earl Clayton and Margaret Clayton
Plat F (R-0447)

Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
pres. and Charles G. Miller, sec.
Herbert Rij and Renate Rij

Plat G (R-0449)

Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
pres and Charles G. Miller, sec.
Max E. Bangerter
Howells, Inc. by Bobby G. Waggoner, vice pres.
Larry LeRoy Smith and Sybil Burton Smith

Plat I (R-0451)

Security Title Company, Trustee by Craig F. Thomson,
pres., and Charles A. Miller, sec.

Neither PMRI nor W. Brent Jensen signed plats E, F, G, or I.
Craig F. Thomson signed them for Security Title as its president.
Even though Respondent recorded the Notice of Lien in 1980, it did not make
any annual assessments until 2000. The roads were maintained by a Summit County
special service district which used its taxing authority to raise money. In late 1999,
Summit County decided was going to dissolve the special service district,
Respondent said it was going to start making annual assessments, and Plaintiff filed
this action as a petition under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute to have the 1973
CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of Lien declared wrongful liens because they had not
11

been signed by the owner of record, Security Title. The trial court dismissed the
petition with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed as a quiet title action.
Petitioner and Respondent filed cross motions for summary judgment based
on the recorded documents - the 1973 CC&R's, the plats and the deeds. The trial
court granted summary judgment for Respondent principally on the grounds that
PMRI had been the trust beneficiary in 1973 and as trust beneficiary had authority
to impose binding CC&R's.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued (1) that there was no
evidence that a trust actually existed in 1965 other than the use of the word "trustee"
on the Bates deed, (2) there was no identified trust beneficiary or terms of trust, (3)
PMRI could not have been the beneficiary because it did not exist until 1973 (4) if
PMRI had been trust beneficiary, it could not be in privity of estate with the lot
owners because as trust beneficiary it had no "estate," (5) if PMRI had been the trust
beneficiary, it did not have the authority as beneficiary to impose the 1973 CC&R's.

The Court of Appeals rejected all Petitioner's arguments. It held that the
following extrinsic evidence proved there actually was a trust in 1965 and that
"Respondent" was the trust beneficiary in 1973. The Court of Appeals actually said
"Respondent," but it must have meant PMRI. Accordingly, in this brief Petitioner
12

will substitute "PMRI" for "Respondent" whenever it describes the Court of
Appeal's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the following extrinsic evidence
that proved there actually was a trust in 1965 and that PMRI was the trust
beneficiary in 1973.
(1) Petitioner's title traces back to Security Title.
(2) Security Title and PMRI recorded the plat identifying PMRI as "owner
and subdivider" and Security Title as "trustee."
(3) PMRI recorded the 1973 CC&R's,
(4) The 1973 CC&R's expressly provide for assessments and a lien.
The Court of Appeals gave no explanation of how this evidence proves as a matter
of law there actually was a trust in 1965 and that PMRI was the trust beneficiary in
1973. The Court of Appeals did not say who the trust beneficiary was in 1965 or
what the terms of the trust were.
In the next to last paragraph of its opinion, the Court of Appeals says that "W
Brent Jensen acted as president of both Respondent [PMRI] and Security." The
Court of Appeals does not say on what evidence it makes that statement. In the
companion case it falsely says that W. Brent Jensen signed the plat in that case as
president of Security Title. The plat in this case was signed by "Gordon H. Dick"
for Security Title. The other plats in the area covered by the 1973 CC&R's were
13

signed by "Craig F. Thomson," the real president of Security Title.
The Court of Appeals further held that there was privity of estate because
Petitioner is a successor in interest to the estate of "the original covenanting
parties," apparently meaning Security Title and Mountainland Properties, Inc., the
person to whom it sold Lot 6 in 1977.
The Court of Appeals held that Security Title ratified the 1973 CC&R's by
recording the Plat. Explaining this ratification, the Court of Appeals said:
"Rather, [PMRI] was acting as an agent of Security, regardless of whether
the owner was Security or a trust with Security as trustee because W. Brent
Jensen acted as president of both [PMRI] and Security." [Addendum Doc.
"8" p. 3, lines 13-16]
The Court of Appeals did not state the factual basis for its holding that PMRI was
the agent of Security Title except to repeat the falsehood that W. Brent Jensen was
the president of both corporations. Of course, the plat shows Gordon H. Dick was
acting for Security Title.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
All the material facts are stated in the foregoing Statement of the case and
Petitioner incorporates them by reference.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In this case Petitioner makes the same arguments that the Petitioner made in
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the companion case except for the last argument:
(1) The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding
covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's") on land and other powers of
disposition.
(2) A trust beneficiary (although a beneficial owner) has no power of
disposition over trust property because the rule of law is that "the trustee has
exclusive control over trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law
or the trust instrument."
(3) Because the names of the trust beneficiaries usually do not appear in the
real estate records (as illustrated by this case), holding that a trust beneficiary has
power of disposition over trust real property will compromise the integrity of the
Utah recording system.
(4) Holding that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust
property will defeat the fundamental basic purpose of trusts - to divide beneficial
ownership of the property from control of the property to protect the interests of the
beneficiary.
(5) Security Title did not "ratify" the 1973 CC&R's by signing and recording
the plat because (a) the CC&R's and the plat cover inconsistent areas, (b) even if
PMRI was the beneficiary of Security Title, it was not the agent of Security Title.
15

ARGUMENTS
1. The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding
covenants, conditions and restrictions on land and other powers of disposition.
[Note: this is the same argument made in the companion case with only
the names changed].
The issueframedby this Court is "whether Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., had
authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and
restrictions." This issue leads immediately to the question of whether imposing
binding covenants, conditions, and restrictions on land is materially different from
disposing of land in some other way - e.g., imposing an easement, imposing an
equitable servitude, or simply selling the land.
The law makes no distinction between one sort of disposition of land and
another. The Utah Statute of Frauds provides:
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
16

surrendered or declared other wise than by operation of law or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing." [Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998)].
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's) are interests in real property in
the nature of real covenants (promises to do), equitable servitudes (promises not to
do), and easements (non-possessory interests). The law treats them all alike
because, as a practical matter, authority to impose binding CC&R's is authority to
determine how land will be used. For example, suppose land is held in trust by T
for the benefit of B. As trustee T determines that the most valuable use of the land
is as a farm. If B as beneficial owner has authority to impose binding CC&R's
limiting the land to residential development, T cannot fulfill the trustee's duty to
manage the land as a farm.
In effect, the decision to impose binding CC&R's is just one of many
economic decisions the trustee must make as trustee. The law cannot carve out the
particular economic decision to impose binding CC&R's and treat it differently
from all the other economic decisions the trustee must make.
2. The long established rule is that "the trustee has exclusive control
over the trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the
trust instrument," and the word "exclusive" precludes the beneficiary from
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having any power of disposition.
[Note: Again, this is the same argument made in the companion case.]
This Court has said three times that "the trustee has exclusive control over the
trust property subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust
instrument."1 This is the uniform American rule.2 It is based on the fundamental
principle of trust law that the trustee is responsible for the trust property (and the
beneficiary is not) because the trustee has control (and the beneficiary does not).
It is true that the beneficiary is the beneficial owner of the trust property, but
this only means that the trust beneficiary has the risk of loss and chance of gain, not
that the beneficiary has power of disposition. "Property" in land is frequently
compared to a bundle of sticks, each stick representing a specific right with respect
to the land. The trust beneficiary has the "stick" of risk of loss and chance of gain
(beneficial ownership) but the trustee has the "stick" of power of disposition
(exclusive control).
A good analogy to beneficiaries of trust are shareholders of publicly held
corporations. The shareholders are the beneficial owners of the corporations' assets
1

In Re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, para. 12, 71 P.3d 589, 594; Matter of
Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351,354 (Utah 1997); Continental Bank & Trust Co, v.
Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P. 872 (Utah 1981).
2

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS sec. 2 (1959).
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because they have risk of loss and chance of gain, but they have no control over
those assets. The board of directors has control. The analogy of corporate law to
trust law is so close that corporate law speaks of the duties of the board of directors
to shareholders as "fiduciary" duties.
Trust law regards the property interest of the beneficiary not as an interest in
the trust property but as an interest in the trust itself. Thus, trust beneficiaries of
non-spendthrift trusts have authority to dispose of their interests in the trust (in
effect, to substitute their transferees as trust beneficiaries) but not the power to
dispose of the trust property.3 Again, shareholders of publicly-held corporations are
a good analogy. The shareholders have authority to sell their shares, but not to sell
the corporations' assets.
This division of beneficial ownership (held by the beneficiary) from control
(held by the trustee) has been the rule of law for centuries. This Court should not
change it now because stare decisis is important in trust law. Past trust settlors and
their attorneys have relied on the established rule of law. They did not anticipate
that the Utah Appellate Court would hold trust beneficiaries have power of
disposition over trust property. If this Court confirms the existence of this new

3

See GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS 132-42 (sec. 37 "Nature of Beneficiary's
Interest" and Sec. 137 "Incidents of the beneficiary's Interest") (6th ed. 1987).
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power, the trustees of these established trusts will not be able to protect their
beneficiaries from the consequences of their beneficiaries' improvidence.
3. The decision of this Court in Capital Assets Financial Services v.
Maxwell does not stand for the proposition that beneficiaries have power of
disposition over trust property.
[Note: Again, this is the same argument made in the companion case,
with some minor editorial changes.]
The Utah Court of Appeals held in the companion case that a trust beneficiary
has power of disposition in the following paragraph in its decision in the companion
case:
"Petitioner next argues that because Deseret had only a beneficial
interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed, Deseret could not encumber
Lot 105A [Lot 6]. However, Petitioner cites no authority stating that a
beneficiary cannot encumber the trust res. In fact, there is authority to the
contrary. See Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell. 2000 UT 9, para. 17,
994 P.2d 201 (holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that
interest). In any event, we will not lose sight of the forest for the trees.
Deseret's actions were subsequently ratified by Security when Deseret and
Security filed Plat D." [2005 UT App 294, para. 36]
It is true that Petitioner cited no authority to the effect that a trust beneficiary cannot
encumber trust property, but the absence of negative authority is not the same thing
as positive authority. The common law rule is that the trustee has exclusive control,
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and Utah adopted the common law rule in 1898 by statute.4 The critical question is
"what did the Utah Supreme Court actually hold in the case the Court of Appeals
cites as positive authority, Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell!"
The facts in Capital Assets Financial Services are simple. A judgment had
been entered against Christensen in favor of Lindsay. Christensen, the judgment
debtor, wanted to borrow $50,000, so he asked a friend to transfer some real
property to him to use as collateral. Lott, the daughter of the friend, provided the
collateral by transferring some land to Christensen by unqualified quitclaim deed on
the understanding that he would use it as collateral and then deed it back to her.
Christensen obtained the $50,000 loan from Capital Assets on a deed of trust and
then deeded the land (now subject to Capital Assets' deed of trust) back to Lott.
Lindsay (Christensen's judgment creditor) claimed that as soon as Lott
transferred the land to Christensen by quitclaim deed, his judgment lien attached
and therefore Capital Assets' deed of trust was subordinate. Capital Assets
countered with the argument that Christensen had taken the land as a trustee for the
benefit of Lott as trust beneficiary, and, therefore, no judgment lien attached under
4

Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004). The
common law rule governed in 1965 when the Bates Deed was delivered. Utah
enacted the common law rule as the statutory rule in 1975 by enacting the Uniform
Trustee's Powers Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code Ann. sec.
7 5 - 7 - 4 0 c^cgr. (1993).
21

the established rule that a judgment lien does not attach to trust property held by a
trustee/judgment debtor in trust for the benefit of another person.
This Court refused to characterize the relationship between Christensen and
Lott as a trust. In paragraph "17" this Court held:
"There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal title
possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial interest that Christensen
undisputably possessed here. Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is purely for the
benefit of another. In the instant case, Christensen received from Lott more
than bare legal title. The quitclaim deed was consistent with passing a fee
interest and the intent of the parties was to allow Christensen to use the
property as security for his own benefit. To hold that Christensen's interest
was a non-beneficial "bare legal title" would be inconsistent with chain of
title and the intent of the parties." [2000 UT 9, para. 17,994 P.2d 201,205].
This is the same paragraph "17" that was cited by the Court of Appeals as holding
that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust property.
It is impossible to reconcile this Court's actual holding (that there was no
trust) with the Court of Appeals' statement of the holding (that a trust beneficiary
has power to encumber). No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of
Appeal's holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range of
"innocent mistake" or even "negligent mistake." The truth is sometimes a matter of
degree - as when the defendant claimed he didn't know the revolver was loaded
when he accidentally shot his wife - six times.
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Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to think about the question of why the
Court of Appeals so mischaracterized this Court's holding. The degree of falsity is
on a par with its holding that W. Brent Jensen signed the Forest Meadow plat for
Security Title when the document was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen. Could any
Utah judge write the words "[W. Brent] Jensen signed on behalf of both Security
and Deseret" without reading the plat? Could any Utah judge write the words
"holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that interest" without
reading this Court's opinion? Ifthe Court of Appeals did read the plat and the
opinion, why did it make these false statements?
4. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over real
property held in trust will compromise the integrity of the Utah recording
system.
[Note: Again, this is the same argument, with some editorial changes,
made in the companion case].
The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case is extraordinary in that it
gives PMRI as trust beneficiary the authority to impose binding CC&R's even
though its status as trust beneficiary does not appear of record. In fact, there is no
indication in the record of who was the trust beneficiary in 1965 or in 1973. The
Court of Appeals did not even attempt to justify its holding that PMRI was the trust
23

beneficiary in 1973. The Court will recall that the way the Court of Appeals
justified its holding Deseret was a trust beneficiary in 1971 in the companion case
was to falsely describe W. Brent Jensen as signing the plat for Security Title as its
president (when the plat was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen as its vice president)
and then, without citing any rule of law, to hold that this false fact proved as a
matter of law that the interests that became Deseret were the trust beneficiaries in
1965 and that Deseret was the trust beneficiary in 1971. But, in this case, the plat
was signed by Gordon H. Dick for Security Title, so even that false justification
does not apply here.
Under Utah real property law, if a person other than the record owner has
power of disposition over Utah real property, the expectation is that the power will
appear of record. For example, if X gives Y power of disposition over land held of
record by X, the expectation is that X will record a written power of attorney
naming Y as X's agent, describing the property, and expressly granting Y power of
disposition.
Any power of disposition that is valid but not of record threatens the integrity
of the Utah recording system because the exercise of that power will be by a deed
that is both wild and valid.
The point is best explained in three steps. The first step is to explain why
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trust instruments with respect to real property are virtually never recorded. This
may strike the Court as strange because the Utah Statute of Frauds expressly
requires a written document to create a trust with respect to real property. Why is it
the uniform practice not to record these written documents?
Three good reasons are: (1) recording is a meaningless gesture, (2) recording
makes any subsequent transferee's title less secure, and (3) recording makes
information public that most people prefer to keep private.
On the first reason, suppose land is deeded to "T as trustee." Does it matter
whether there actually is a trust or not? It does not. If there is no trust, T has
exclusive control over the land as both record and beneficial owner.5 If there is a
trust, T has exclusive control over the land as trustee. Therefore, whether there
actually is a trust or not (or what the terms of the trust may be, or who the
beneficiaries of the trust may be) is of absolutely no importance at to anyone with
whom the trustee deals. Recording the trust is a meaningless gesture.
As for the second reason - that recording makes any transferee's title less
secure - suppose the trust document is recorded and then the trustee sells the
property in possible violation of the terms of the trust. The person who bought the

5

This is the effect of Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 ("Form of warranty
deed - Effect") and 57 -1 -13 ("Form of quitclaim deed - Effect") (2000).
25

land may have acquired defective title due to constructive notice (due to the trust
having been recorded) of the violation.6 The transferee's title is safer if the trust
document is not recorded.
On the third reason, recording a trust makes the trust a public document.
Criminals and nosey people may read the document and use the information they
obtain to make trouble for the trust beneficiaries and their families.
So, the uniform practice is not to record the trust instrument even though the
Utah Statute of Frauds requires that a trust in any manner relating to real property be
in writing.
The second step of the analysis is to see that while the actual existence of the
trust is irrelevant if the trustee has exclusive control (whether as absolute owner or
as trustee), it makes a great deal of difference if the trust beneficiary has power of
disposition. If deeding land to "T as trustee" gives power of disposition to unnamed
beneficiaries, then it very much matters whether there actually is a trust, what the
terms of the trust are, and who are the beneficiaries.
Please note that a deed to "T as trustee" (like the 1965 Bates deed in this
case) is insufficient to create a trust in itself because it does not name the

6

See Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 406 ("Third persons protected in dealing
with trustee") and sec. 15-1 - 409 (2) (1993).
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beneficiaries or state the terms of the trust. It just conveys the property to T.7
The third step is to understand the logic of the Utah recording system. The
logic goes in a three stage process like the game of baseball.
In baseball the fist stage is for the pitcher to throw the ball over the plate. If
the pitcher can't do this, the batter gets to go to first base without even trying to hit
the ball. However, if the pitcher throws the ball over the plate, the game goes to the
second stage. The batter has to hit the ball. If the batter doesn't hit the ball (and it
crosses the plate three times), the batter is out without the fielders even trying to
make a play. But if the batter does hit the ball, the game goes to the third stage.
The fielders have to make a play.
Each stage is reached if and only if the prior step is accomplished. If the
pitcher doesn't throw the ball over the plate, the batter can stand there looking at the
clouds. If the batter doesn't hit the ball, the fielders can pass their time playing
video games.
The Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act sets up a similar three
stage process. The fist stage is for the person asserting the interest in real property

7

It would, of course, be possible to create a trust by a deed that designated
the grantee as trustee, identified the beneficiaries, stated the terms of the trust and
conveyed the land as trust property, Utah Code Ann. sec. 75 - 7 - 409 (l)(a)
(1993), see GEORGE A. BOGART, TRUSTS 22 (Sec. 10 (b) (6th ed. 1987).
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to produce the written instrument creating that interest. In this case, that written
instrument would be a trust document naming Security Title as trustee, naming the
beneficiaries, and stating the terms of the trust.
If Respondent had produced that trust document (if effect, throwing the ball
over the plate), the law would go to the second stage. Petitioner could claim the
trust document was void as to it under the Utah Recording Act because it was never
recorded.8 If Petitioner made that claim (in effect, hitting the ball), the law would
go on to the third stage. It would be up to Respondent to show that Petitioner could
have discovered the trust document by reasonable inquiry (in effect, making a play).
The point is that Respondent has not produced the trust document. The first
stage of the law was never accomplished. Therefore, under the express language of
the Utah Statute of Frauds, PMRI's power of disposition over real property was
never validly created even if PMRI was the actual beneficiary of the trust. PMRI
can be the actual trust beneficiary without compromising the integrity of the Utah
recording system, but it can't have authority to impose binding CC&R's without
compromising the integrity of the Utah recording system.
The Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the three stage process of the Utah
recording system by ignoring the first stage. In effect, it held that the word "trustee"
8

Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-3-103 ("Effect of failure to record") (2000).
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on the Bates deed put Petitioner on inquiry notice that there might be a trust. This is
perfectly true but totally insufficient. Petitioner being put on notice that there might
be a trust is not the same thing as Respondent producing the trust document. Under
the Utah Statute of Frauds, no trust document, no trust. Respondent never threw the
ball over the plate.
Finally, the reason why the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals will destroy
the integrity of the Utah recording system is that when a deed shows that land is
held in trust (e.g., by "T as trustee under the X family trust dated January 1,2006"),
and someone records a wild deed purporting to dispose of the land in some way
(e.g., by imposing CC&R's) the record will not show whether the person recording
the wild deed was or was not a trust beneficiary because the trust document will not
have been recorded. But, under the holding of the Court of Appeals, even if the
trust document is never produced (as it has never been produced in this case), if the
trial court thinks that the person signing the wild deed actually was a trust
beneficiary (perhaps not on fabricated evidence as in this case, but on some valid
evidence), the trial court must validate the wild deed.
5. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over trust
property will defeat the basic purpose of trusts - to protect the beneficiary's
beneficial ownership by holding the trustee responsible for the control of the
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trust property.
[Note: this is the same argument made in the companion case.]
The basic purpose of a trust is to protect the beneficiary's beneficial
ownership of the trust property by holding the trustee responsible for the control of
the trust property. People do not create trusts because they want the beneficiaries to
have control of the trust property. They create trusts because they want the trustees
to have control of the trust property.
"Control of the trust property" means making decisions with respect to the
trust property - decisions like whether land is to be developed for residential use, or
farmed, or rented out, or sold, or whatever. "Control of the trust property" can be
more complicated than simply maximizing economic value. For example, a trust
instrument may make the trustee responsible for managing a farm while preserving
it as a farm and not turning it into something like a subdivision.
If the trust beneficiary has authority to impose binding CC&R's (or any
similar power of disposition), the trustee cannot fulfill the duty imposed by the
terms of the trust. For example, suppose that a married couple, are getting on in
years and set up an estate plan in the form of an intervivos trust. The general terms
of the trust are income to them for their joint lives, income to the surviving spouse
for life, and on the death of the surviving spouse for the trust property to be
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distributed to their children. This Court dealt with this sort of trust in 2003 in In Re
Estate ofFlake.9 Anyway, the married couple are the initial trustees but after some
years they decide to turn over the job to one of their sons because they no longer
trust their own judgments. Then the husband dies. More years pass and the
surviving wife is now 90 years old and somewhat forgetful. She lives in a
retirement community and leaves all financial decisions to her son as trustee - but
she does not lack the legal capacity to make a contract.
The surviving wife is the sole income beneficiary. The children have future
reminder interests but the son as trustee has power to invade corpus as he considers
necessary or appropriate for the health and welfare of his mother. The trust is
irrevocable and cannot be amended. Finally, the trust says nothing about whether
the surviving spouse has any power of disposition over the trust assets.
One of the assets held in trust is a tract of land title to which is held of record
by the son "as trustee under the X Family Trust." The declaration of trust was not
recorded.
The issue is whether the surviving wife as beneficial owner has authority to
impose binding CC&R's on the tract of land - exactly the same issue as in this case
but with a complete factual setting, an actual trust document and known
9

2003UT17,71P.3d589.
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beneficiaries.
There is no conceivable reason why the established rule of law (that the
trustee has the exclusive control over the trust property subject to the terms of the
trust instrument and the law) should be overturned to give such a power to the
surviving wife. The whole purpose of the trust is for the son to be responsible for
making all the economic decisions. The economic decision to impose binding
CC&R's cannot be pulled out and treated differently than the others.
The law will have to go either all one way or all the other - either stay with
the established rule that the trustee has exclusive control or permit the trust
beneficiary to make whatever economic decisions she wants. If the law takes the
latter route, the son cannot protect his mother from evil people who prey on the
elderly.
Sometimes courts don't appreciate the practical consequences of the decisions
they make for the very best abstract reasons. In the world of legal abstractions, its
seems plausible that the beneficial owner of land should be able to dispose of it in
whatever way she pleases. But, on a practical level, how many Califomian hunters
would come to Utah if Utah declared open season on hunting deer? And as a
practical matter, what will happen if this Court declares open season on hunting
elderly trust beneficiaries?
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7. Security Title did not "ratify" the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing the
plat because PMRI was not its agent, (2) PMRI did not purport to act for
Security Title, (3) the Utah Statute of Frauds requires any agency with respect
to real property to be in writing, (4) the plats and the 1973 CC&R's are
inconsistent with each other.
[Note: This is not the same argument as was made in the companion case.
In this case the Court of Appeals did not base the agency relationship on the
trust relationship, but entirely on the false fact that W. Brent Jensen was the
president of Security Title.]
The Court of Appeals appears to have decided this case on alternative
grounds - (1) that PMRI as beneficial owner had authority to impose binding
CC&R's, and (2) that Security Title "ratified" the 1973 CC&R's by signing and
recording the plat. But, this Court limited certiorari to one issue, "whether [PMRI]
had the authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and
restrictions." This limitation raises the question of whether this Court sent
Petitioner on a fool's errand because even if Petitioner persuades the Court that
PMRI did not have direct authority as trust beneficiary, this Court will not permit
Petitioner to challenge the alternative grounds.
In the companion case Petitioner argued that it had not been sent on a fool's
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errand because both grounds of decision go to "authority" - to the authority of the
beneficiary to impose binding CC&R's on its own behalf (the first grounds) or to
the authority of the beneficiary to do so on behalf of its trustee (the alternative
grounds). But in this case the Court of Appeals makes the agency depend not on the
trust relationship but entirely on the false fact that W. Brent Jensen was the
president of Security Title. In this case the Court of Appeals held:
"Rather, Respondent [PMRI] was acting as an agent of Security, regardless of
whether the owner was Security or a trust with Security as a trustee because
W. Brent Jensen acted as president of both Respondent and Security." [2005
UT App 265, para. 8, Addendum document "8" lines 13-16].
In short, the agency does not depend on the trust relationship, but on the false fact
that W. Brent Jensen was the president of Security Title.
Petitioner respectfully points out that unless this Court takes up the agency
issue, it will give its approval to what it knows is a gross injustice. The truth is that
W. Brent Jensen was never the president of Security Title. The record shows that
the president of Security Title was Craig F. Thomson, and that Gordon H. Dick and
Leo D. Jensen were vice presidents.
Moving from fact to law, even if W. Brent Jensen had been the president of
Security Title, that would not have made PMRI the agent of Security Title as a
matter of law. Agency is created by the agent consenting to act for the benefit of

34

and subject to the control of the principal and the principal consenting that the agent
so act.10 It is not created by two corporations having the same president. Then there
is the point that under the Utah Statute of Frauds any agency with respect to real
property must be created by a written document. There is none here.
Then there is the obvious point that the 1973 CC&R's (for Pine Meadows
Ranch) cover the western part of Forest Meadow Plat D, the part that extends into
Section 21. No rational person would impose the 1973 CC&R's on the western part
of Forest Meadow Plat D, the Rerecorded CC&R's on the southeastern part of
Forest Meadow Plat D, and no CC&R's at all on the northeastern part of Forest
Meadow Plat D.
The holding of the Utah Court of Appeals cannot be defended on any moral
or legal grounds. It is contrary to every principle of decency and law. But, and
perhaps this is the decisive point, it could be avoided. This Court has the power to
say "well, we did not grant certiorari with respect to that issue so we will not take it
up no matter how immoral and illegal it may have been." But, it would amount to
ratifying a falsehood.
This Court has the power to avoid the issue, but it cannot avoid the moral
responsibility. A play ground bully cannot justify beating up a weaker child by
10

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
35

sec.

(1958).

saying "I promised myself I would beat you, and it would be wrong for me to break
my promise."
CONCLUSION
This Court should first hold that PMRI did not have authority as beneficial
owner (trust beneficiary) to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions.
Next, on the agency issue (the alternative grounds of decision), this Court should
rule that since the Court of Appeals based its holding that PMRI was the agent of
the Security Title on a falsehood (i.e., that W. Brent Jensen was the president of
Security Title) which this Court knows to be a falsehood, this Court cannot affirm
on that grounds in good conscience. This Court should therefore order that
certiorari be extended to the agency issue and that Petitioner and Respondent submit
briefs.
Dated: January 12,2006.
Respectfully submitted:
/s/Briyd Kimball Dyer
f
\
ATEQBKEY FOR PETITIONER/APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing Opening
Brief (Corrected) by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service,firstclass postage
prepaid, addressed to the following person:
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216
Dated: January 12,2006
/s/Boy
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "1" -1965 BATES DEED.
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WARRANTY DEED
of

Pea $6.$047

F. E. BATES, also known as F. Ephralm Bates, and
MAE P. BATES, also known as Mae Pritchett Bates, his wife
Coalville
County of
Summit

CONVEY

^•.^i?

"Oct.10 •

grantor a
State of Utah, hereby

andWARRANT to
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, TRUSTEE,
a Corporation of Utah
grantee
County

Salt Lake City
for the sura of

Salt Lake

, State of Utah

TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

the following described tract o( land in

ElOlftXXtt

Suosalt and Morgan

County,

Sate of Utah, to-wic
The South half of Section 16; the East half of the Southeast
quarter of Section 17; the East half of die East half of
Section 20; all of Sections 21, 22, 27 and 28; the East half
of the East half of Section 29; the North half and the North
half of the South half of Section 33; the North half and the
North half of the South half of Section 34; all In Township
1 North, Range A East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
(Containing tpproxlmately 4264.68 acres.)
TOGETHER WITH all water and water rights however evidenced
appurtenant to or used upon or In connection wlfh said property.
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing
of record or enforceable in law and equity, and taxes for the
year 1965 and thereafter.

WITNESS the hand sof said grantors, this
Signed In the presence of

STATE OP UTAH

14 th

day of

October

A. a 19 6 5 .

—-

SSL

COUOTY OF SALT LAO
On the 14th day of

October

A. a 1965

personally

appeared before me 7 . E. BATES, a l s o known at P. Ephrala Batea,
lnd^HA£"P. BATES, arliflrknovn as Mae T r i t c h e t t Bates,
hla wife
the signers of »be within Instrument who duly adbwwkdged
» me that t ha ycxecuted the same, '

I
My iCpmmisdon Expires:
12/21/67

f

Notary Publk
..Residing at .

* * v * r*n&zCS<L*Cit *

I

Salt Lake Cltx,JU T ah

}

ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "2" - 1973 CC&R's.

Entry No. 1 2 0 3 6 7 l>
*iSO
RECORDrD ?-? * - 7 3 c' /» 3 9>' n
*&/JA
REQU531 , f W 8 re o + Jk A/St n
—
FEE
INDEXED
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DECLARAflONl

DF* COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

THIS DECLARATION, made on t h i s

^5

day of August, 1973,

brBtfcE MEADOW RANCH, INC., hereinafter referred to as "Declarant."

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Declarant la the owner of or intends to acquire
certain property i n Summit County, State of Utah, which i s more
particularly described a s :
The South one-half
quarter of Section
20; All of Section
Salt Lake Base and

of section 16; the East half of the Southeast
17; the East half of the East half of Section
21; a l l in Township 1 North, Range 4 East,
Meridian (containing approximately 1,200 a c r e s ) .

NOW THEREFORE, Declarant hereby declares that a l l of the
properties descriDed above shall be held, sold and conveyed
subject to the following easements, restrictions, covenants,
and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting the
value and d e s i r a b i l i t y of, and which shall run with, the real
property and be binding on a l l parties having any right,

title

or i n t e r e s t i n the described properties or any part thereof,
their h e i r s , successors and a s s i g n s , and shall inure ' o the
benefit of each owner chereof•
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ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
Section 1,

"Association" shall mean and refer to Pine

Meadow Ranch Home Owners1 Association, its successors and assigns.
Section 2.

"Owner" shall mean and refer to the record owner,

whether one or more persons or entities, of a fee simple title to
any Lot which is a part of the Properties, including contract
sellers, but excluding those having such interest merely as
security for the performance of an obligation.
Section 3.

"Properties" shall mean and refer to that certain

real property hereinbefore described, and such additions thereto as
may hereafter b e brought within the jurisdiction of the Association.
Section 4.

"Common Area" shall mean all real property owned by

the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the owners.

The

Common Area to be owned by the Association at che time of the conveyance
of the first lot is described as follows:

Section 5.

"Lot" shall mean and refer to any plot of land shown

upon any recorded subdivision map of the Properties with the exception
of the Common Area.

B00KM5O
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Section 6.

"Declarant" shall mean and refer to P-ne Meadow

Ranch, Inc., its successors and assigns if such successors or assigns
should acquire

more than one undeveloped Lot from che Declarant for

the purpose of development.

ARTICLE II
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Section 1.

Owner*-* Easements of Enjoyment.

Every owner shall

have a right and easement of enjoyment in and to the Common Area
which shall be appurtenant to and shall pass with the title to every
Lot, subject to the following provisions:
(a)

The right of the Association to charge reasonable

admission and other fees for the use of any recreational
facility situated upon the Common Area;
(b)

The right of the Association to suspend the voting

rights and right to use of the recreational facilities by
ai owner for any period during which any assessment against
his Lot remains unpaid; and for a period not to exceed 60 days
for any infraction of its published rules and regulations;
(c)

The right of the Association to indicate or transfer

all or any part of the Common Area to any public agency,
authority, or utility for such purposes and 3ubjert to such
conditions as may be agreed to by the members.

No sucn

dedication or transfer shall be effective unless an instrument
signed by two-thirds (2/3) of each member agreeing to such
dedication or transfer has been recorded.

3

B00KM5O r<T52"3

Section 2.

Delegation of Use.

Any owner may delegate, in

accordance with the By-Laws, his right of enjoyment to the Common
Area and facilities to the member* of his family, his tenants, or
contract purchasers*

ARTICLE III
MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS
Section 1.

Every owner of a lot which is subject to assessment

shall be a member of the Association.

Membership shall be appurtenant

to and may not be separated from ownership of any Lot which is subject
to assessment.
Section 2.
membership.

The Association shall have only one class of voting

A member shall be all Owners *nd shall be entitled to

one vote for each Lot owned.

When more tl\an one person holds an

interest in any Lot, all such persons shall be members.

The vote

for such Lot shall be exercised as they imong themselves determine,
but in no event shall more than one vor<* be cast with respect to any Lot.

ARTICLE IV
COVENANTS FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS
Section 1«

Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation

of Assessments.

The Declarant, for each Lot owned within the

Properties, hereby covenants, and each Owner of any Lot by
acceptance of a deed therefor, whether of not it shall be so
expressed in such deed, is deemed to covenant and agree to pay to
the Association:

(1)

annual assessments or charges, and (2)

special assessments for capital improvements, such assessments to

B00KM5O
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be eata'blished,,ittd collected &s hereinafter provided.

The annual

and special'assessments) together with interest, costs, and
reasonable attorney's feeo, shall be a charge on the land and
shall be a continuing lion upon the property against which each
luch assessment is made.

Each such assessment, together with

interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, shall also be
the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such
property at the time when the assessment fell due.

The personal

obligation for delinquent assessments shall not pass to his
successors in title unless expressly assumed by them.
Section 2.

Purpose of Assessments.

The assessments levied

by the Association shall be used exclusively to promote the
recreation, health, safety, and welfare of the residents in the
Properties and for the improvement and maintenance of the recorded
roads, Common Area, and of the homes situated upon the Properties.
Section 3.

It is agreed that the Association has the right,

in the event any member allows his lot or lots to become an eye-sore,
unattractive, or a nuisance by taeans of neglect ot carelessness, to
cause the lot to be corrected.

The cost of such correction to be

paid by the members and to become a liin on the lot being so corrected.
However, before the Association can take such action the member roust
be given 30-days written notice by registered mail.
Section A.

Special Assessments for Capital improvements.

In

addition to the annual assessments authorized above, the Association
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nay levy/-In any assessment y^ar, a special assessment applicable
to thati year only for the purpose of defraying, In whole or In part,
the/coat,of any construction, reconstruction, repair or replacement
of a capital Improvement upon the Common Area, Including fixtures
and personal property related thereto, provided that any such
assessment *hall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes
of each member whom are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting
duly called for this purpose.
Section 5«
Section 3.

Notice and Quorum for Any Action Authorized Under

Written notice ot any meeting called for the purpose

of taking any action authorized under Section 3 shall be 3ent to all
members not less than 30 days nor more than 60 days in advance of the
meeting.

At the first such meeting called, the presence of members

or of proxies entitled to cast sixty percent (60Z) of ail the votes
of each class of membership shall constitute a quorum.

If the

required quorum is not present, another meeting may be called
subject to the same notice requirement, and the required quorum at
the subsequent meeting shall b*» one-half (1/2) of the required
quorum at the preceding meeting.

No such subsequent meeting shall

be held more than 60 days following the preceding meeting.
Section 6.

Uniform Rate of Assessment.

Bo\-h annual and

special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for services
provided for all Lots, and may be collected on a monthly, quarterly
or annual basis.
Section 7.

Date of Commencement of Annual Assessments:

Due Dates.

The annual assessments provided for herein shall commence as to all
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Lots on the first day of the month following the conveyance of the
*•

Common Area.

V *

The first annual assessment shall be adjusted according

to the number of months remaining in v\e calendar year.

The Board

of Directors shall fix the amount of the annual assessment against
each Lot at least thirty (30) days in advance of Gach annual
assessment period*

Written notice of the annual assessment shall

be sent to e v e v ^wner subject thereto.
established by the Board of Directors.

The due dates shall ^e
The Association sha'l, upon

demand, and for a reasonable charge, furnish a certificate signed
by an officer of the association s&tling

forth whether the assess-

ments on a specified Lot have been paid*
Section 8.
the Association.

Effect of Nonpayment of Assessments*

Remedies of

Any assessment not paid within thirty (30) days

after the due date shall bear interest from the due date at the rate
of evolve percent (12%) per annum.

The Association may bring an

action at law against the Owner personally obligated to ,>ay the
same, or foreclose the lien against the property

No owner may

waive or otherwise escape liability for the assessments provx^ed
for herein by non-use of the Common Area or abondonment of his Lot.
Section 9.

Subordination of the Lien to Mortgages.

The lien

of the assessmento provided for herein shall be subordinate to the
lien ot any first mortgage.

Sale or transfer of any Lot shall not

affect the assessment lien.

However, the sale or transtar of any

lot pursuant to mortgage foreclosure or any proceeding in lieu
thereof, shall extinguish the lien of such assrasments as to

•7-
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payroents which became due prior to such sale °r transfer.

No sale

or transfer shall relieve such Lot from liability for any assessments
thereafter becoming due or from ttw lien thereof.
Section 10. Rubbish removal.

It is agreeded that the association will

contract annually to remove the personal rubbish from a common pick-up area.
ARTICLE V
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL
No building, fence, wall or other structure shall be commenced, erected
or maintained upon the Properties, nor shall any exterior addition to or
change or alteration therein be made until the plans and specifications
shoving the general nature, kind, shape, height, materials, and location of
the same shall have been submitted to and approver' in writing as lo harmony
of external design and location in relation to surrounding structures and
topography by the Board of Directors of the Association, or by an architectural
committee composed of three (3) or more representatives appointed by the Board.
In the event said Board, or its designated committee, fails to approve or
disapprove such design and location within thirty (30) days after said plans
and specifications have been submitted to iti approval will not be required and
this Article will bo deemed to have been fully complied with.

ARTICLE VI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1.

Enforcement.

The Association, or any Owner, shall

have the right to enforce, by any proceeding law or in equity,
all restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens and
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charges now or hereafter imposed by the provisions of this Declaration.
Failure by the Association or by any Ovmer to enforce any covenants
or restriction herein contained shall in no event be deemed a
waiver of the right to de so thereafter.
Section 2.

Severability.

Invalidation of any one of these

covenants or restrictions by judgment or court order shall in no
wise affect any other provisions which shall remain in full force
and effect.
Section 3.

Amendment.

The covenants and restrictions of

This Declaration shall run with and bind the land, for a term of
twenty (20) years from the date this Declaration is recorded,
after which time they ohall be automatically extended for
successive periods of ten (10) years.

This Declaration may be

amended during the first twenty (20) year period by an instrument
signed by not less than ninety percent (90%) of the Lot Owners,
ai*d thereafter by an instrument signed by not less than seventy-five
percent (75%) of the Lot Owners.
Section 4.

Annexation.

Any amendment must be recorded.

Additional property and Common

Area may be annexed to the Properties with the consent of twothirds (2/3) of the outstanding votes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the Declarant herein,
has hereunto set its hand and seal this

15

day of

August

1973

PTNF, MFADOW RANCH

Declarant

9-

^

800KM5O pft;;T

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF-SA*#=&\KE

)

On the 28th day of September 1973, personally appeared before
mr W. Brent Jensen, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the
President of Pine Meadow Ranch and that said lnstrunment was signed
in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws, and said
W. Brent Jensen acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the

7
_M1^

ri

Reed D Pace, Notar) Public
Residing in Summit County

H

W . t l

My Commission Expires.

February l g , 1975
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TATE OF UTAH

)

ounty of Summit

)

I, Alan f * :f:~*:, Ccjn!y R-jconier in and for Summit Oounty, State of Utah,
o herebv cc..*iv inzi the aitacr.od and foregoing is a full, true and correct copy

rthat certain

fai

^

t

f CcVawnbtCc-r>Aih'^

'hich appears of record in my office in Book / I K £
eing Entry No.
/J2£<7(r 7

AM

» PaQ0 £xQl~ 539

. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, | hive hereunto set my hand and affixed my
fficial seal, the //-/ %
day of Ottemhf
r
19fZf/L7/

mm^.r^w,
77

Summit County Ffecor46r
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Paul Howard Peters,
Petitioner and Appellant,

Pine Meadow Ranch Home
Association aka Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Owners Association
and as Pine Meadow Ranch
Association,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20040396-CA
F I L E D
(June 30, 2005)
2005 UT App 265

Respondent and Appellee.

Third District, Silver Summit Department, 990600413
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck
Attorneys:

Boyd Kimball Dyer, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Edwin C. Barnes and Walter A. Romney, Jr., Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Petitioner Paul Howard Peters appeals the trial court's
grant of Respondent Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association's motion
for summary judgment. We affirm.
When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for summary
judgment, this court reviews for correctness, giving no deference
to the trial courtfs conclusions of law, and considers all
evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light
most favorable to the losing party below. See Black v. Allstate
Ins. Co. , 2004 UT 66,f9, 100 P.3d 1163. Summary judgment is
proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
"the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We addressed most of Petitioner's arguments on appeal in
Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Ass'n, 2005 UT App 264, also issued today. Because
the facts of this case closely track those of Forest Meadow,

where applicable, the same reasoning applies. Indeed, the facts
in the instant case provide even stronger support for our
reasoning in Forest.
First, Petitioner argues that Respondent shoulders the
burden to show both that a trust existed and that descriptio
personae does not apply to the Bates Deed--the deed by which Lot
6, among others, was transferred to Security Title Company
(Security). In this case, while there was no mention of a trust
beneficiary on the face of the Bates Deed, there is sufficient
extrinsic evidence indicating the existence of a trust with
Respondent as beneficiary to overcome the presumptive application
of descriptio personae. See id. at ff29-30. To wit,
Petitioner's title traces back to Security, the entity that took
title to the property in the Bates Deed as "trustee." Further,
before Security transferred Lot 6, (1) Respondent and Security,
acting together, filed Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "D" (Plat D ) ,
identifying Respondent as owner and subdivider and Security as
"trustee," and (2) Respondent recorded the 1973 Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions (the 1973 CC&Rs), which affect Lot 6
and specifically prescribe that each owner "pay to [Respondent]:
. . . annual assessments or charges," as well as "interest,
costs, and reasonable attorney[] fees." Additionally, the 1973
CC&Rs provide that assessments are a continuing lien on the
properties. We view this evidence sufficient to overcome
descriptio personaefs presumption that no trust existed.
Second, Petitioner contends that the 1973 CC&Rs do not run
with the land for want of privity of estate. However,
traditional notions of privity of estate exist here. For
example, there is horizontal privity here because the 1973 CC&Rs
were created in anticipation of subdividing and selling lots.
See id. at f35. Furthermore, there is vertical privity because
Petitioner is a successor to the estate of the original
covenanting parties. See id.
Third, Petitioner urges that it could not encumber Lot 6
with the 1973 CC&Rs because Respondent had only a beneficial
interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed. However,
Security, as trustee, ratified Respondent's encumbrance of Lot 6
when it and Respondent filed Plat D. See id. at 1(36.
Fourth, Petitioner argues that the 1973 CC&Rs violate the
doctrine of uniformity because they cover only 219 of 444 lots in
the Pine Meadows Subdivision. However, "the doctrine of
uniformity has not been adopted in Utah, and Petitioner did not
allege facts sufficient to warrant an examination of the doctrine
in this case." Id. at 1(3 9.
Fifth, Petitioner posits that this court's holding in Dunlap
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2003 UT App 283, 76 P.3d
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711, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2004), refutes an inference
of the trust's existence drawn from the 1973 CC&Rs.
Specifically, Petitioner claims that because we disregarded the
Dunlap plaintiffs1 inference of ownership from "a stray title,"
id. at fll, that we must also disregard Respondent's inference of
ownership from the 1973 CC&Rs because there was no recorded deed
whereby Security granted Lot 6 to Respondent. However, Dunlap
does not compel such reasoning. Here, unlike the situation
presented in Dunlap, Respondent is a homeowners association
seeking to act in that capacity by placing covenants, conditions,
and restrictions on subdivided property. Additionally, unlike
Dunlap, Respondent is not an adverse party claiming superior
title vis-a-vis a competing owner. Rather, Respondent was acting
as an agent of Security, regardless of whether the owner was
Security or a trust with Security as trustee because W. Brent
Jensen acted as president of both Respondent and Security. Also,
in Dunlap, Park City Development's interest fell outside a
reasonable grantor and grantee index search, see id. , whereas
here, reasonable title research of Lot 6 would have revealed the
possibility of a trust, raising inquiry notice.
Finally, Petitioner argues, without citing authority, that
the trial court erred when it concluded that "even if [the 1973
CC&Rs] are not restrictive covenants that run with the land, they
are restrictions that were contractually agreed upon [by
Petitioner's] predecessors in interest and the developer of the
subdivision." However, we agree with the trial court. The 1973
CC&Rs, coupled with the deed language, bind Respondent and its
members, respectively, to collect and pay yearly homeowners
association assessments. See Forest Meadow, 2005 UT App 264 at
136.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling.

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

